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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
TRUSTEE'S LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT TO SELL REALTY
WHERE TRUSTEE ACTS IN GOOD FAITH

A testamentary trustee made a written contract for the sale of certain trust real
estate. The vendee was informed at the time the deposit was made on the contract
that the trustee was acting as a fiduciary and would have to accept a higher offer if
one were made before the delivery of the deed. Prior to delivery of the deed, the
trustee received and accepted a higher bid from another party. In an action by
the vendee for breach of contract, Held, the trustee acted in good faith, and yendee's recovery must be limited to the deposit money and necessary expenses. Kargiatly v. Provident Trust Co., 338 Pa. 358, 12 A. (2d) 11 (1940).
Much confusion has existed for years in regard to the damages recoverable
from the vendor for breach of written or parol contracts to sell land. McKeehan,
Vendor and Vendee (1929) 33 DICK. L. REV. 87. The able Supreme Court opinion in Seidlek v. Bradley, 293 Pa. 379, 142 A. 914 (1928), which contributed
greatly to the clarification of these problems laid down the general rule that "a
vendee in a contract for the sale of land may recover as damages the loss of his
bargain if his contract is in writing and the vendor in bad faith refuses to convey.
The present case, which holds that, notwithstanding a contract in writing
for the sale of land, the trustee is not liable for the loss of the bargain to the vendee
for selling to a highLr bidder if the trustee has acted in good faith, is the converse
of the proposition set forth in Seidlek v. Bradley. The distinguishing feature is
that in this recent case the court has decided that since the trustee was under a legal
duty to refuse to perform his original contract, he should be deemed to have acted
in good faith in breaching the contract where he gives notice to the first vendee at
the time of making of the contract. Thus the court limits the recovery of the
vendee to any part payments on the contract and to necessary expenses incurred by
the vendee during the transaction.
The view that a fiduciary must refuse to perform a contract to sell trust property where there is a subsequent higher offer prior to the delivery of the deed to the
first vendee, and must accept the higher offer, is firmly established in Pennsylvania.
Good v. Capital Bank & Trust Co., 337 Pa. 353, 11 A. (2d) 489 (1940); Clark
v. Provident Trust Co., 329 Pa. 421, 198 A. 36 (1938); McCullough's Est., 292
Pa. 177, 140 A. 865 (1928); Orr's Est., 283 Pa. 476, *129 A. 565 (1925); Brittain's Est., 28 Pa. Super Ct. 144 (1905).
In Clark v. Provident Trust Co., supra, the court in citing McCullough's Est.
and Orr'sEst. has stated the rule as follows: "A trustee must dispose of trust property upon the most advantageous terms which it is possible for him to secure for
the benefit of the estate which he represents."
The case of Yerkes v. Richards, 170 Pa. 346, 32 A. 1089 (1895), presents
similar facts except that the vendee did not know and was not informed that the
trustee reserved the right to sell to a higher bidder after the contract was made
with the vendee but prior to the delivery of the deed to the vendee. The court
here held that the substituted trustee, who replaced the trustee, was liable on breach
of contract for the difference between the contract price and the market value at
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the time of the breach. The judgment for damages was entered against the substituted trustee to be paid by the trust estate.
Although the court failed to discuss the problem, the fact that distinguishes
Yerkes v.Richards from Kargiatly v. Provident Trust Co. as to the amount of
damages recoverable is that in the latter case the trustee acted in good faith by
informing the vendee that the trustee would have to accept a subsequent higher
offer despite the already existing contract for the sale of thle property.
A discussion of the contractual principles involved, of the curious result that,
by doing what is required by law, the fiduciary-seller is committing a legal wrong,
and a criticism of the rule forcing fiduciaries to sell to a subsequent higher bidder
despite a previous contract to sell the trust prop'erty are presented in an able article
by Hon. Robert Grey Bushong, Fiduciaries Contract, FIDUCIARY REVIEW, May,
R.D.H.
1940.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF

Thue life beneficiary of a trust attempted to surcharge a trustee because he had
awarded a stock dividend to the corpus of the trust rather than to the income.
Bard's Estate, 339 Pa. 433, 13 A. (2d) 711 (1940).
The court held that the fact that the cestui had received income after the allocation by the trustee did not amount to acquiescence in the allocation because "there
was nothing in the record to show that the life tenant had knowledge of the stock
dividend," but that the trustee could not be surcharged because although the trustee
"should have informed the income beneficiaries of the receipt" of the stock dividend "there is nothing in the record to indicate that the trustee failed in the perW. H. H.
formance of this duty."

MILK CONTROL LAW-ACT OF

1937, P. L.

417-APPLICABILITY TO

CONSIGNMENT CONTRACTS

Plaintiff milk dealers secured in the Dauphin County Courts a preliminary
injunction restraining the Milk Control Commission and the Attorney General
from proceeding criminally or civilly, except by hearing before the Commission,
against plaintiffs for their failure to gay minimum prices to producers whose milk
plaintiffs handled on "consignment, and for failure to file bonds to insure payment for milk so handled. Appeal from final order making the injunction permanent. Held, the Milk Control Law does not confer upon the Commission power
to require milk dealers to file bonds and pay minimum prices where milk is received by the dealers on consignment. Green, et al. v. Milk Control Commission,
, 16 A. (2d) 9 (1940), Stem and Patterson, J. J., dissenting.
Pa.
et al.,
The Milk Control Law states that it was "enacted for the purpose of regulating and controlling the milk industry in this Commonwealth" (§ 101), and vests
in the Commission "power to supervise, investigate and regulate the entire milk
industry of this Commonwealth" (§ 301). The Act has been upheld under the
constitutions of Pennsylvania and of the United States. Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy
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v.Milk Control Comm., 332 Pa. 15, 1 A. (2d) 775, 122 A. L.R. 1049 (1938);
Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S.346 (1939). See also
HarrisburgDairies,Inc. v. Eisaman, 338 Pa. 58, 11 A. (2d) 875 (1940); Rohrer
v. Milk Control Bd., 322 Pa. 257, 186 A. 336 (1936).
Plaintiffs entered into agreements with producers und'er which, instead of
"buying" milk from producers and in turn "selling" itto consumers, the dealer
designates himself a 'factor" and undertakes to act as "consignee" of the milk
and to process and find a buyer therefor, title remaining in the producer until sale,
at which time it passes directly from producer to consumer. The "factor" collects
from the consumer, remits a price stipulated in the agreement, and retains the balance as ,comrpensation." (The agreed prices to be remitted were below the minimum set by the Commission.) This appeal raises the question whether the Legislature succeeded in clothing the Commission with power to apply the price-fixing
and bonding provisions of the Act to such transactions.
The majority answer, "No!" saying, "The power and authority to be exercised by administrative commissions must be conferred by legislative language
Such tribunals are extra judicial. They should act
clear and unmistakable ....
within the strict and exact limits defined". The majority turn to the Act and, finding that the words "consign" or "consignment" are nowhere used, conclude that
the Commission's power does not embrace consignment contracts. "We are asked
by the Commission to interpolate these words into the Act. This we cannot do
without violating th'e important principle to which we have adverted." (pp. 9-10).
These conclusions are a distillation of the opinion of the court below (48 Dauph.
385, Greer, J., dissenting), which is in effect incorporated in the majority opinion
here.
Underlying the regulation of milk prices is the theory that in order to assure
the public an adequate and wholesome supply of milk it is necessary to maintain
p rices to producers which will make it worth their while to continue in business.
It seems manifest that under this decision the way is open for dealers to handle
milk on "consignment," unhampered by price regulation and paying the lowest
figure obtainable in wide-open competition. In periods of surplus production, it
seems fair to predict, the dealer may virtually set his own price.
Justice Stern, with the concurrence of Justice Patterson, in dissenting advocated a liberal interpretation of the language of tht Act in order to carry the legislative purpose into effect and advanced two grounds for finding the power sought
by the Commission: (1) The "consignment" transaction does ultimately involve
a sale to the consumer and is thus brought within the Commission's admitted powers; (2) The language of the Act itself is broad enough to include "consignments"
when considered in the light of the expressed purpose of its enactment.
An elementary and long established rule of statutory construction is that requiring the interpretation ofan act in a manner effectuating the legislative purpose. 1937, P. L. 1019, § 51, 45 P. S. § 551; Big Black Creek Improvement Co.
v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. 450 (1880). As pointed out, the construction adopted
by the majority would appear to defeat the purpose of the Milk Control Law. A
further rule of interpretation requires that an ad be construed so as to render it
constitutional. 1937, P. L. 1019, § 52, 45 P. S. § 552; In re Shelley, 332 Pa. 358,
2 A. (2d) 809 (1939). Under the decision of the majority, the Act applies to
milk "dealers" but not to "factors" under the "consignment" contracts. The Act
in so discriminating constitutes a denial of equal protection of law as guaranteed
by the Constitution unless there is a reasonable basis for such discrimination.
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Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400 (1910). Since "dealers" and "factors"
occupy identical positions in the scheme of milk marketing, the existence of such
basis would seem to be doubtful. The Court, in reaching a conclusion in conflict
with that indicated by the above rules, places its decision on the ground that the
grant of administrative powers must be strictly construed. The validity of this
proposition, the delegation of legislative functions being constitutional, would
seem to be dependent on legislative policy with regard to the grant of administrative powers. This policy in turn would be derived properly from the latest legislative enactment on the subject, in this case the Milk Control Law of 1937. It is
interesting to note in this connection that the Dauphin County Court admitted that
the declaration of purpose was sufficiently wide to include the transaction in quesL.G.
tion.

CORPORATIONS-CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF STATUTE

TO SUE SHAREHOLDER OF CORPORATION

ENABLING

EMPLOYEE

FOR WAGES DUE

Plaintiff brought an action of assumpsit against the corporation employing
him, and certain shareholders of that corporation under § 514 of The Business
Corporation Law of May 5, 1933, P. L. 364, 15 P. S. 2852-514, for the purpose
of recovering wages claimed to be due him. The appellant shareholders contested
their liability under this statute, contending that the statute is unconstitutional in
that it discriminates between shareholders, denying them equal protection of law,
and takes their property without "due process of law." Held, Judgment in favor
of plaintiff for wages for a six months' period preceding the instigation of the
, 15 A. (2d) 723
Pa. Super.
suit. Eiffert v. Penna. Central Brewing Co.,
(1940).

Although this section of the Business Corporation Law has been in effect for
over six years, this case is the first to test its constitutionality. The statute provides
that a shareholder of a business corporation shall be personally liable, up to an
amount equal to the value of his shares, for salaries and wages due its employees,
provided that suit be brought against him within six months after the same shall
become due. It is also provided that in any such action, the plaintiff may include
as defendant the corporation itself and any one or more shareholders claimed to
be liable. If plaintiff gets judgment, execution shall first be levied against corporate property, and then, in case property sufficient to satisfy the judgment cannot be found, execution shall be levied on the property of defendant-shareholders
for the deficiency. Shareholders who satisfy the judgment or any part thereof
may have contribution from the corporation in the first instance, and if contribution is unobtainable from the corporation, then pro rata from the other solvent
shareholders originally liable for the claims on which judgment was obtained.
The attack on the constitutionality of this legislation is directed against its
procedural rather than its substantive features, with more emphasis placed on the
provisions that deal with contribution than on those having to do with the original
action by the creditor. Are the shareholders who happen to be selected by the
employee as defendants in the action deprived of their property without due process o7 law?
As the Court points out, while obviously it would have been to the advantage
of the appellant shareholders to have had all the other shareholders joined with
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them in the action, the absence of such a requirement is not peculiar to this statute,
and is not contrary to prevailing practice. For example, tort actions are frequently
brought against a municipality which is only secondarily liable without joining the
property owner who isprimarily liable. The purpose of this statute was to assure
the wage-earner a speey and secure method of recovering overdue wages. Wagner-Taylor Co. v. McDowell, 131 Pa. Super. Ct. 425, 9 A. (2d) 144 (1940).
Hence, to require the employee to ascertain the identity and residence of all the
shareholders of the corporation and join them in one action would cause much
delay and certainly would not follow the spirit of the statute.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that the shareholders are at liberty to
bring into the action such other shareholders as are equally liable with them, under
the Rules of Civil Procedure No. 2252 et seq. Under these rules, any shareholder
joined as an additional defendant would be as liable as if he had been sued originally. Taking this into account, it is apparent that there is nothing within this
portion of the act that discriminates between shareholders. "Differences due to
voluntary action and diverse individual choices constantly arise under equal laws."
St. Louis & Kansas City Land Co. v. Kansas City, 241 U. S. 419 (1916).
The contention that the remedy of contribution is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to deprive the shareholders of their property without due process of law is
untenable. "Contribution is bottomed and fixed on general principles of natural
justice." Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218, 5 Am. Rep. 368
(1870); Parker v. Rodgers, 125 Pa. Super. 48, 189 A. 693 (1937). It is well
settled that this right may be qualified or controlled by agreement. Lorimer v.
Julius Knack Coal Co., 246 Mich. 214, 224 N. W. 362 (1929). Under this act,
the general right of contribution is qualified by the requirement that the corporation is primarily liable, and then, if the corporation is incapable of reimbursing
the defendants, all the shareholders could be made defendants, and the appellant
shareholders could recover a ratable proportion from the solvent shareholders
within the jurisdiction. Rest. Restitution, § 85 (h). Furthermore, it must be remembered that the liability of the shareholders under the statute being contractual
(Wagner-Taylor Co. v. McDowell, supra) their statutory duty of contribution became a part of their contract as shareholders, to which they necessarily assented
when they became shareholders. (The Act of 1933 is but a re-enactment of §§ 14
and 15 of the General Corporation Act of 1874, P. L. 73). Under these circumstances the provisions for contribution cannot be said to deprive the shareholders
of their property without due process of law.
It is important to note that two essential elements must be complied with if
the employee is to take advantage of this statute. First, recovery cannot be had
for wages due for more than six months preceding the instigation of the suit and
this rule is adhered to despite the fact that the corporation is in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings, as was the corporation in the Eiffert case. Second, the Eiffert
case holds that, under the statute, thle plaintiff is required to include the corporation as an additional defendant some time prior to judgment. While the statute
merely says "may include," the court construes these words to be mandatory rather
than permissive, basing their decision on several Pennsylvania cases. Lansdowne
Bank and Trust Co.'s Case, 323 Pa. 380, 186 A. 120 (1936); Mansfield Iron
Works v. Willcox, 52 Pa. 377 (1866); Hoard v. Willcox, 47 Pa. 51 (1864).
§ 514 B states that judgment shall b'e given against the corporation and any shareholder found liable, thus contemplating that the corporation must be included as a
J.E.M.
party before judgment is given.

